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1.
Negotiation Journal ; 39(2):207-228, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-20242527

ABSTRACT

Joint decision-making processes such as negotiations play a vital role in diverse societal contexts spanning from business and politics to sustainability-related negotiations. One of the most prominent examples of how negotiations play an important role in overcoming societal challenges was the COVID-19 vaccine supply negotiations. These negotiations have put the spotlight on an aspect of joint decision-making that always has been of great interest to both negotiation researchers and practitioners yet remains empirically understudied- the effect of uncertainty. In the present article, we develop a framework of uncertainty in negotiation using the COVID-19 vaccine supply negotiations between the European Union and pharmaceutical companies as an example. More specifically, we categorize different kinds of uncertainty based both on mathematical considerations (i.e., differentiation between risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty) as well as on more circumstantial factors. To do so, we adapted the nine kinds of uncertainty in environmental governance proposed by Dewulf and Biesbroek to the more general context of negotiations. We first differentiate between three natures of uncertainty (i.e., lack of knowledge, unpredictability, and interpretations) and three objects of uncertainty (i.e., issue- based, strategy- based, and context- based). Second, we illustrate the psychological barriers that negotiators face when handling uncertainty, before concluding with proposals for practitioners on how to manage different kinds of uncertainty. Overall, we aim at stimulating investigations of the effects of uncertainty in mixed- motive decision- making while simultaneously helping negotiation teachers and practitioners better cope with the additional demands created by specific kinds of uncertainty.

2.
Negotiation Journal ; 39(2):133-135, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-20236061
3.
Insight Turkey ; 24(3):23-31, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2324628

ABSTRACT

The best way to think about the climate emergency is to imagine humanity has just arrived at a new planet somewhere in a distant galaxy. After all, as scientists tell us, our planet Earth will soon look like a new planet, with conditions radically changed from the 'climate niche' of the past 10,000 years, during which human civilization developed. Once settled on the new planet, our task is to terraform it, to build a new natural environment fit for human life and human flourishing. My general approach to the politics of climate change thus differs from the most common view among environmentalists. I do not believe we can speak of climate change as a product of the Anthropocene, the human-built world. Our inability to control the consequences of climate change shows this is still at heart a natural process, one triggered by human beings or, more specifically, by our limited ability to control natural processes and therefore by our incapacity to control the unintended consequences of our actions and choices. The solution to the climate emergency is not to exit the Anthropocene but, intriguingly, to enter it for the first time. The world building is a task significantly full of existential meaning and urgency.

4.
Insight Turkey ; 24(3):259-261, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2322725
5.
Insight Turkey ; 24(3):4-9, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2321747
6.
Round Table ; 109(3):328-329, 2020.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2326448

ABSTRACT

A disclaimer to start with: in a federal union of 1.3 billion persons comprising 17 per cent of humankind, 36 states and territories, multiple languages and ethnic groups, few if any observations are valid across the whole country. Democracies find it hard to make tough decisions and to adapt when they need to improvise without precedents;pre-emption to tackle a problem before it becomes a crisis is never a democratic strength, especially in a federation. India took relatively early steps against Covid-19: visas were rescinded on March 18;international flights stopped on March 22;and domestic flights were terminated on March 24. Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for a 12-h nation-wide voluntary curfew on 22 March, marked with high observance, which was a dress rehearsal for a full lock-down from 24 March for 21 days with relaxations for medicines, media, banks and groceries. The national closure was the most comprehensive in history. At that stage, India had registered 500 cases and 10 deaths. The trade-off was to lose lives to Covid-19, or gain time to prepare health services and risk the economic consequences. Modi acted quickly although it caused hardship to millions. By and large, the lockdown was observed, justifying the theory that Indians react best in emergency mode.

7.
World Affairs ; 186(2):510-513, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2319838
8.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 23(1):43-51, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2318648

ABSTRACT

Despite the challenges, remittances frequently remain a primary source of economic support for those left behind, as well as for national development of post-conflict countries. [...]situations in the wake of recent conflicts are known for heightened remittance flows.3 As a large share of the remittance flows in conflict settings occurs through informal channels, the importance of remittances in these economies has often been underestimated. A focus on broader settings that can provide security, justice, and economic sustenance to individuals and communities affected by the crisis has been reflected in the human security approach6 to post-conflict7 development.8 Remittances can be central to fighting poverty—by diversifying household income sources, providing capital for productive investment and facilitating local markets, and funding education, health, and other social expenses.9 Remittances can contribute to post-conflict recovery in the long term. "20 Horst has shown that among the Somali diaspora in Norway, most political engagements do not occur through state institutions but take place on sub-national levels, including individual and group money transfers and certain humanitarian initiatives.21 Somali diaspora members mediate with clan leaders and elders who can contribute to reconciliation processes through customary mechanisms such as compensatory payments, but as noted above, such involvement can also sustain continued warfare.22 While the role of diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction efforts can be significant, diaspora can also remain an "under-utilized resource" whose strong emotional connection to their home country is offset by unstable institutional environments.23 Weak formal institutions and regulatory frameworks may offer little systematic support for entrepreneurship development, which is constrained by high transaction and compliance costs. Informal institutions and cultural attitudes remain important in the post-conflict assimilation of returning migrants who bring with them beliefs and understandings from their countries of settlement, resulting in hybrid norms and institutions.24 Many forcibly displaced and returning migrants may also lack properly transferable professional skills.25 The transfer of social and political remittances does not always signify "diffusion of democracy"—the effects of returning migrants to democratization depend on their experience of political mobilization as migrant workers, as well as on the status of democratic values in the political order of the host country, among other factors.26 Changing perspectives on conflict-affected remittances Remittances became central in the migration scholarship only in the 1990s, when the analytical focus shifted from migration as a result of [End Page 44] decision-making of rational individuals towards a more nuanced view of the role of households, social networks, and community in migration processes.

9.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 23(2):169-178, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2318536

ABSTRACT

[...]a broad and inclusive approach to post-pandemic policy-making—one that considers Indigenous forms of knowledge whilst fostering appreciation for their cultures and lives—is needed to adequately assist Indigenous peoples in repairing the harm they have suffered as a result of COVID-19.3 COVID-19 and its deadly impact on Indigenous communities There are no less than eight hundred distinct Indigenous communities across Latin America, each with its own unique identity, culture, and [End Page 169] history. In Bolivia, for example, where Indigenous groups comprise a significant portion of the electorate (between 41 and 62 percent of the population), Latin America's first Indigenous political executive was elected in 2006.4 In most instances, however, Indigenous peoples make up only a small proportion of Latin American country populations (generally ranging from 0.5–15 percent), one factor ensuring limited political influence and the widespread marginalization of their interests.5 As a consequence, Indigenous peoples across the region entered the pandemic whilst already suffering from a range of serious economic and socio-cultural inequalities.6 Inadequate access to medical care, chronic poverty and economic marginalization, racism and prejudice, and inadequate access to education are common issues that exacerbated the impact of the pandemic.7 The World Health Organization confirmed the arrival of the pandemic in the region on February 26, 2020. [...]Indigenous mortality rates were 4.03 percent in Brazil and 19.9 percent in Mexico—significantly higher than 2.2 percent and 5.7 percent overall mortality rates in each country respectively.9 Unfortunately, the lack of regional data on, and deliberate under-reporting of, Indigenous mortality rates across much of Latin America has problematized many of the available datasets.10 In Brazil, for example, organizations such as The Articulation of Indigenous Peoples (APIB), have shown that the total number of recognized Indigenous deaths (902 persons as of April 7, 2022), undercounts the actual figure by at least 31 percent.11 Other sources, such as the Special Secretariat for Indigenous Health (SESAI), which is responsible for Indigenous medical care, also provides incomplete data on Brazilian Indigenous mortality by failing to count Indigenous urban dwellers or those who live outside of recognized government-controlled territories in their data sets.12 Such groups are among some of the most vulnerable Indigenous communities in the country, receiving little, if any, support from government agencies charged with supporting Indigenous communities.13 As a result, the scale and scope of COVID-19's impact on Indigenous Brazilians is, and for the foreseeable future will likely remain, unknowable.14 Despite a lack of adequate data across much of Latin America, a growing body of evidence indicates that Indigenous peoples were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, and that they likely died or suffered long-term health issues in disproportionate numbers.15 In a study of Indigenous peoples in Chile, for instance, regions with larger Indigenous populations recorded a noticeable increase in overall mortality.16 Where direct data do not exist, emerging studies suggest that the medical impact of COVID-19 was likely compounded by a range of structural inequalities and environmental factors.17 Many Indigenous peoples lack access to adequate medical care. [...]disproportionate exposure to pesticides—used extensively in agricultural industries in which many Indigenous people find employment, as well as exposure to smoke inhalation—caused by out-of-control forest fires across Latin America—likely exacerbated the repertory symptoms caused by COVID-19.18 As a consequence, Indigenous peoples had to face COVID-19 not only with fewer resources, but with greater exposure to the types of pre-existing conditions known to aggravate the impact of the disease.19 Particularly high mortality rates among Indigenous elders, who act as stores of traditional knowledge, affected cultural continuity and community cohesion.20 To better understand this we spoke with a representative of the Indigenous Kaingang people, Duko Vãgfy, who explained that "[t]he worst losses [we suffered] were the elders, because they held so much knowledge about [our] people.

10.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 23(1):1, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2316489

ABSTRACT

Returning to the world prior to March 2020, though, is perhaps more of a return to a status quo in which those occupying positions of privilege and power—particularly in the Global North—shift focus back to the conventional news cycle. Aside from early reporting on COVID-19, former President Donald Trump's first impeachment trial and reactions to the United States' assassination mission of Qasem Soleimani dominated headlines in early 2020. [...]we cannot return to holding that level of unconcern for similar violence in the United States towards historically marginalized communities like Black and Indigenous People of Color.

11.
Insight Turkey ; 24(2):25-38, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2315293

ABSTRACT

The world politics of the 2020s seems to consist of two realities: People are concerned about an ecological catastrophe, as tion kills and climate change threatens societies. The focus of this article is to discuss climate change, and state politics in the Arctic in the context of the two realities. Behind this is the assumption that climate change mitigation is a challenge to state politics and national security. The commentary assumes that, although in world politics, there is a new (East-West) great power rivalry with its related conflicts, no armed conflicts appear in the Arctic, but environmental degradation and rapid climate change still threaten the people. The study firstly analyses how environmental issues came onto the political agenda of States, in particular, that of the Arctic states;secondly, it discusses huge investment packages and great power rivalry as substitutes for climate change mitigation, revealing the political inability of states;thirdly, it examines the Arctic from the point of view of functional cooperation on environmental protection, and that on science;and finally, it concludes what has possibly gone wrong in state politics related to the environment, and could be taken as the biggest challenge.

12.
The Middle East Journal ; 76(1):144-146, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2315074

ABSTRACT

Gunter reviews Salafism and Biological Evolution: Online Salafi Reflections on the Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection, by Jean-Francois Letourneau.

13.
The Middle East Journal ; 76(1):125-128, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2314679

ABSTRACT

Gabiam reviews Everybody's War: The Politics of Aid in the Syria Crisis edited by Jehan Bseiso, Michiel Hofman, and Jonathan Whittall.

14.
Australian Journal of International Affairs ; 77(2):150-168, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2313964

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic poses fundamental challenges to the ways that the discipline of International Relations makes sense of our world. Framing the pandemic as both a social disaster and as part of an ongoing polycrisis, this work argues that existing responses to COVID-19 are, whatever their insights, partial and limited, predicated on assumptions about how we know the world now shown to be problematic. This situation calls less for some defined incremental change and more for a period of uncomfortable disciplinary reflection on the boundaries, purposes and value structures that shape IR.

15.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 23(1):77-83, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2313658

ABSTRACT

Women, the rural poor, young people, and other vulnerable groups should not have to bear the brunt of the pandemic's socio-economic implications.6 First introduced in Kenya in 2007, the digital payment service "M-Pesa" has grown rapidly, becoming the most common mode of payment for goods and services in the East African region.7 Basking in the service's success facilitating payment transactions, Kenya has risen to the top of regional rankings in both the supply of mobile money services and bank account ownership (Figure 1). According to the 2017 Findex Report, the global trend of bank account ownership in middle to low-income countries stood at 63 percent in 2017. [End Page 79] smartphones and digital literacy are associated with poverty and are the main barriers to getting online.14 According to Research ICT Africa's Retail Africa Mobile Pricing (RAMP) Index, price is another barrier, since data is still quite expensive in many African countries.15 Financial inclusion during COVID-19 According to an International Finance Institution (IFC) study of thirteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized firms (MSMEs) were most adversely affected by COVID-19, due to their smaller size and high concentration of ownership.16 Many of these female owners indicated that their companies had lost more than half of their revenues and that they had experienced an increase in the cost of their operations due to the pandemic. According to the Research ICT Africa's phone survey,19 58 percent of those who received the facility were individuals and women-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (WOSME).20 This demonstrates that women, particularly those working in the

16.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 23(1):123-127, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2312435

ABSTRACT

The authors stress that both economic and military investments will be required to counter China's integration of statecraft and industry.1 It is further suggested that a selective procurement of allies within the Asian-Pacific region is necessary to counter Chinese economic dominance, military aggression, and coercive practices.2 An Open World suggests that the United States should look to build on existing relationships within trade and security cooperatives in the Indo-Pacific region and bolster the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, to become a formal alliance that projects a robust military presence to counter Chinese aggression and encroachment within the South China Sea. [...]the authors point out the current dearth of expertise, talent, and diplomatic finesse that exists within the United States Department of State. In November 2020, the four members participated in a joint naval exercise meant to improve sea readiness for their fleets.6 This exercise was followed by a virtual meeting the following March and the establishment of working groups to tackle challenges such as supply-chain resilience and COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution.7 If these working groups are the extent of the Quad's influence, then the United States needs to seek other alliances to combat China's aggressive economic and military tactics. Coupling public and private sector goals While this type of partnership with private firms is promising, the authors admit to the widening gap between the national security interests of the public sector and the industrial mission of private corporations, which seems to weaken their argument.

17.
International Affairs ; 69(2):61, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2293340

ABSTRACT

The world is on the cusp of a new technological revolution. The rapid development of advanced technology is already moving entire industries into the virtual realm. Global digitalization is penetrating all areas of social life. The contours of the emerging global information order are gradually taking shape. All of this not only opens gigantic opportunities for the development of all countries but also creates new challenges in terms of the legal regulation of cyberspace, which does not always adjust to current realities quickly enough. Therefore, new forms and ways of committing unlawful acts in cyberspace are emerging. The COVID-19 pandemic, which to a large extent has taken economic and social life online, has also led to the transformation of information crime. The potential victims most negatively affected by this situation are primarily vulnerable segments of society - children and adolescents. According to Interpol and Europol reports, there has been a significant increase over the past few years in material that contains child sexual abuse, especially in the streaming format, as well as an increase in the effectiveness of the Dark Web at adapting to such criminal activity.

18.
Insight Turkey ; 25(1):13-27, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2291142

ABSTRACT

We are experiencing the rise of unprecedented opportunities as a result of the digital revolution, but regrettably this has also been accompanied by a number of novel threats. One of the most visible manifestations of these threats is the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation. The implications of this threat extend from the individual to the national and international levels, where misinformation and disinformation bring the risk of hybrid warfare and power competition closer to home. Needless to say, the breadth of these implications makes dealing with digital misinformation even more difficult. This commentary focuses on several global events where misinformation and disinformation were used as a tactical tool, including the 2016 U.S. elections, Brexit, and COVID-19. Then, we discuss the situation involving Türkiye, one of the nations that serves as both a target and a focal point of regional disinformation campaigns. The commentary then shifts to some of the Communication Directorate's most significant initiatives, such as the creation of the Earthquake Disinformation Bulletins, the Law on the Fight Against Disinformation, and the Center for Fight Against Disinformation. Finally, above all, this commentary aims to raise awareness of the dangers of online misinformation and urges international cooperation to ensure that the truth always prevails.

19.
Social Justice ; 48(2):1-7, 2021.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2290698

ABSTRACT

While the working and middle classes have faced the challenges brought about by job layoffs resulting from corporate mergers and the lack of an economic support system to provide a survivable quality of life, the top one percent has enjoyed the benefits of increasing monetary gains from tax cuts and stock market investments. Reduced state funding and the infusion of marketplace principles and practices have resulted in the treatment of students as a revenue stream for raising tuition, which, in turn, increases student dependence on loans benefiting primarily Wall Street private lenders. [...]higher education has become the victim of a hostile takeover by neoliberal principles that utilize higher education as a laboratory for economic practices and redesign work roles to monetize the value of higher education. [...]they argue that for the last fifty years, neoliberalism has penetrated the academy and intercollegiate athletics and has been speeding toward a separation of the university and athletics by prioritizing business and profit interests as well as private and corporate sponsorships, and by increasing reliance on governance by the NCAA rather than universities (including academic standards and compliance).

20.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ; 21:62-70, 2020.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2304344

ABSTRACT

[...]the article closes with policy recommendations to prevent the weaponization of wheat. [...]Russia has recently violated Swedish airspace,8 simulated attacks on Norway,9 jammed GPS systems during NATO exercises,10 and tested new missile systems.11 Russia's quest for melting Arctic fossil fuels is part of an overall plan to leverage the advantages they gain from climate change, a plan that is marked by increased aggression and strategic manipulation of climate-vulnerable regions. [...]as importing countries transition away from fossil fuels, demand for Russian oil and gas will decrease, reducing the overall [End Page 63] revenue for the Russian economy. Countries that fell under the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War are less diversified in their energy mixes than those in Western Europe and are highly dependent on Russia.19 For example, in 2015, the stateowned oil and gas company Gazprom increased prices for the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Poland.20 EU antitrust regulators found that Gazprom was manipulating gas prices in Bulgaria and Poland to force them to participate in additional pipeline projects.21 Such manipulative tactics could indicate future avenues for hybrid warfare, through which Russia combines military strength with economic, resource, technological, or political aggression.22 Russia's use of energy as a form of hybrid warfare can also be seen clearly in Ukraine.

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